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Abstract
According to the media, in spring of this year the experiment CDF at Fermilab
had made most likely (“this result has a 99.7 percent chance of being correct”[1]) a
great discovery (“the most significant in physics in half a century”[2]). However, since
the very beginning, practically all particle physics experts did not believe that was the
case. This is the last of a quite long series of fake claims based on trivial mistakes in
the probabilistic reasoning that can be sketched with the following statements, under-
standable by everybody: the probability of a senator to be a woman is not the same as
the probability of a woman to be a senator; a free neutron has only 3× 10−4 probabil-
ity to decay after two hours, but, if we observe a neutron decaying after such a time,
this is not an indication of an anomalous behavior of such a particle; the fact that the
probability of a Gaussian random generator with µ = 0 and σ = 1 to produce a number,
rounded to three decimal digits, equal to 3.000 is 4.2 × 10−6 does not allow us to say
that, once this number has been observed, there is only 4.2× 10−6 probability it comes
from that generator, neither that 4.2× 10−6 is the probability that 3.000 is a statistical
fluctuation; and not even, still considering the latter numerical example, we can say
that the probability of 3.000 to be a statistical fluctuation is 1.3× 10−3, ‘because’ this
is the probability of such a generator to produce a number larger or equal than the
observed one. The main purpose of this note is to invite everybody, but especially
journalists and general public, most times innocent victims of misinformation of this
kind, to mistrust claims not explicitly reported in terms of how much we should believe
something, under well stated conditions and assumptions. (A last minute appendix has
been added, with comments on the recent news concerning the Higgs at LHC.)




The title of this paper is a paraphrase of that of an article (“Probably guilty: Bad mathe-
matics means rough justice”), appeared in New Scientist in October 2009 [3], whose incipit
induced me to write a ‘defense of Columbo’,1 that finally turned into a sui generis intro-
duction to probabilistic reasoning [5].
Indeed, as I wrote in [5], “I can give firm witness that scientific practice is plenty of
mistakes of the kind reported [in the cited New Scientist article], that happen even in
fields the general public would hardly suspect, like frontier physics, whose protagonists are
supposed to have a skill in mathematics superior to police officers and lawyers.” In fact,
although it might sound amazing, the ‘bad mathematics’ that induces a judge to form a
wrong opinion about somebody’s guilt or innocence is the same that, for example, in April
of this year made media and general public believe that particle physicists strongly believed
(although not yet certain) Fermilab had made “the most significant discovery in physics
in half a century”[2] – how else should normal people interpret a statement such as “this
result has a 99.7 percent chance of being correct”[1]?
Although I am quite used to fake claims of this kind, some of which are discussed in [6],
and I have no interest in analyzing each individual case, the reason I want to return here
to this subject, focusing on the Fermilab case, is twofold. First, due to the modern fast
communication on the internet, I was involved in discussions about the issue ‘discovery or
not?’ and realized that even people with university background in mathematics or physics
were induced to think that it was most likely a discovery, or at least that Fermilab physicists
were convinced this was the case. Second, a few days after the CDF announcement, I had
to lecture PhD students in Perugia [7] and therefore I amused myself to collect related news
and comments on the internet, because I expected that claim would have been a hot topic,
as it turned out to be the case. Finally very recent interactions with students and young
researchers in Lecce [8] convinced me to resume the paper draft started on the train Rome
to Perugia.
2 The facts
On the 4th of April this year a paper appeared in the arXiv reporting about the “Invariant
Mass Distribution of Jet Pairs Produced in Association with a W boson in pp Collisions at√
s = 1.96TeV” [9] and the result was officially presented two days later in a ‘special joint
experimental-theoretical physics seminar’ at Fermilab [10]. In the meanwhile, on the 5th
of April the article “At Particle Lab, a Tantalizing Glimpse Has Physicists Holding Their
Breaths” appeared on The New York Times [2]. The following days the news spread all
around the world (you can amuse yourself enquiring Google with the languages you know).
Let us sketch how that happened.
1Besides the inappropriate reference to the Columbo’s episode, I consider that article substantially well
done and I recommend its reading. To those interested in the subject “probability and the law” I also
recommend, as starting points for further navigation, refs. [4].
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Figure 1: CDF data [9] before and after ‘arithmetic’ background subtraction
2.1 The (filtered and processed) data
Figure 1 reports the upper plots of figure 1 of the cited CDF paper. The left side one shows
the histogram of the ‘data’,2 the jet-jet mass distribution in 8 GeV bins, for a total of about
10800 events3 (points with vertical bars). The colored regions show the predictions split
into several contributions, the most important of which is due to the production of two W
bosons, or of a W boson together with a Z boson (red). We see that at around 140 GeV
there are more events than ‘expected’ (an expression which we shall return to later).
The right side plot shows the data after the contributions called here ‘background’ (all
but the red one of the left plot) were subtracted ‘arithmetically’.4 In the five bins between
120 and 160 GeV there are about 230 events (but in the side bins there are even ‘negative
events’ whose meaning is only mathematical). That was ‘the excess’.
2For non experts it is important to clarify, although this is not deeply relevant here, that the histogram’s
‘data’ are non simple ‘empirical observations’, but a result of selections and analysis (including calibrations),
after suitable definitions of physical objects, like what a ‘jet’ is.
3This number, as well as 230 that follows, was estimated from the figure – precise numbers are irrelevant
for the purpose of this paper.
4It seems rather natural to think that, if the purpose of a ‘subtraction’ would be that of highlight extra
physical components in the spectrum, this procedure should not be simply an ‘arithmetic subtraction’ and,
in particular, it should not yield unphysical negative counts.
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2.2 The statistically motivated claim
A customary way to quantify the difference between an observed spectrum and the expected
one is the famous χ2 statistic.5 The CDF paper reports a “χ2 per degree of freedom” (χ2/ν)
of 77.1/84 for the entire spectrum and 26.1/20 for the region 120-160 GeV. In both cases
statistical practice based on this test states that “there is nothing to be surprised”.
I know by experience that, when a test does not say what practitioners would like,
other tests are tried – like when one goes around looking for someone that finally says one
is right.6 Indeed, in the statistics practice there is much freedom and arbitrariness about
which test to use and how to use it. This is because hypothesis tests of the so called classical
statistics do not follow strictly from probability theory, but are just a collections of ad hoc
prescriptions. For this reason I do not want to enter on what CDF finally quotes as p-value
(with the only comment that it does not even seem a usual p-value). Let us then just stick
to the paper, reporting here the claim, followed by a reminder about what a statistician
would understand by that name:
• “we obtain a p-value of 7.6 × 10−4, corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard
deviations”;[9]
• “the p-value is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as the
one that was actually observed, assuming that the null hypothesis is true.”[11] [The
null hypothesis (H0) is in this case “only standard physics, without contributions from
new phenomena”.]
2.3 How the claim was explained to the general public (and perhaps even
what some particle physicist thought)
But now we come to the clue point of this paper, since the CDF report [9] is by itself not so
‘dangerous’. People do not know about p-values and, as a matter of fact, even those who
calculate them for scientific purposes seem to by highly confused about their meaning [11],
as we shall see later. Normal people only understand what is the chance that a team has
made a discovery instead of having just observed a statistical fluctuation. Or, at least, how
much experts believe that the bump is hint of new physics, instead than a fluke.
Let us go straight to read how the thing was reported in some online resources (boldface
is mine).
5Let us remind that if a variable is described by a χ2 distribution with ν degrees of freedom, our (proba-
bilistic) expectation (‘expected value’) is ν, with expectation uncertainty (‘standard deviation’)
√
2ν. Hence
if θ1 and θ2 are variables of that kind, with ν1 = 84 and ν2 = 20, our expectations will be “84 ± 13” and
“20± 6”, respectively. (As a side remark, we notice that, that adding a Gaussian component to explain the
‘excess’, the difference between expected and observed value of the test statistic increases, since the χ2 goes
to 56.7 for the entire region and 10.9 for the ‘peak region’.)
6After years of practice in particle physics and related subjects, I have developed my rule of the thumb,
which until now has never failed: “the funnier is the name of the test used to show that there is a disagreement
with the ‘Standard Model’ (or whatever is considered firmly established), the less I believe that this is the
case” (with the corollary that “in the future I will tend to mistrust those people”).
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• The New York Times, April 5 [2]:
“Physicists at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory are planning to
announce Wednesday that they have found a suspicious bump in their data
that could be evidence of a new elementary particle or even, some say, a
new force of nature.
. . .
The experimenters estimate that there is a less than a quarter of 1
percent chance their bump is a statistical fluctuation”
• Fermilab Today, April 7 [12]
“Wednesday afternoon, the CDF collaboration announced that it has ev-
idence of a peak in a specific sample of its data. The peak is an excess
of particle collision events that produce a W boson accompanied by two
hadronic jets. This peak showed up in a mass region where we did not
expect one.
. . .
The significance of this excess was determined to be 3.2 sigma, after ac-
counting for the effect of systematic uncertainties. This means that there
is less than a 1 in 1375 chance that the effect is mimicked by a
statistical fluctuation.”
• Discovery News, April 7 [1]
“If you’re a little hazy about the details of Wednesday’s buzz surrounding
the potential discovery of ”new physics” in Fermilab’s Tevatron particle
accelerator, don’t worry, you’re not alone. This is a big week for particle
physicists, and even they will be having many sleepless nights over the
coming months trying to grasp what it all means.
That’s what happens when physicists come forward, with observational
evidence, of what they believe represents something we’ve never seen before.
Even bigger than that: something we never even expected to see.
. . .
It is what is known as a ”three-sigma event,” and this refers to the sta-
tistical certainty of a given result. In this case, this result has a 99.7
percent chance of being correct (and a 0.3 percent chance of being
wrong).”
• Jon Butterworth’s blob on the Guardian [13]
“The last and greatest breakthrough from a fantastic machine, or a false
alarm on the frontiers of physics?
. . .
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If the histograms and data are exactly right, the paper quotes a one-in-
ten-thousand (0.0001) chance that this bump is a fluke.”
Let us make the logical complements of the highlighted statements (with the exception of
the Discovery News one, that already provided the complementary propositions):
• “there is more than 99 percent chance their bump is not a statistical fluc-
tuation”;
• “there is more than 99.93% chance that the effect is not mimicked by a
statistical fluctuation”;
• “the paper quotes a 99.99% chance that this bump is not a fluke” ,
that can be summarized saying that ‘we’ should be highly confident this is a genuine
discovery .
3 Where is the problem?
The question is very simple. No matter which test statistic has been used, there is no
simple logical relation between a p-value and the probability of the hypothesis to test (‘H0’
— in this case “H0 = No New Physics”).
Indeed, p-values are notoriously misunderstood, as well explained in a section of Wikipedia
that I report here verbatim for the convenience of the reader [11], highlighting the sentences
that mostly concern our discourse.
1. “The p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis is
true. In fact, frequentist statistics does not, and cannot, attach probabili-
ties to hypotheses. Comparison of Bayesian and classical approaches shows
that a p-value can be very close to zero while the posterior probability of
the null is very close to unity (if there is no alternative hypothesis with a
large enough a priori probability and which would explain the results more
easily). This is the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
2. The p-value is not the probability that a finding is “merely a
fluke.” As the calculation of a p-value is based on the assumption that a
finding is the product of chance alone, it patently cannot also be used to
gauge the probability of that assumption being true. This is different from
the real meaning which is that the p-value is the chance of obtaining such
results if the null hypothesis is true.
3. The p-value is not the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis.
This error is a version of the so-called prosecutor’s fallacy.
4. The p-value is not the probability that a replicating experiment would not
yield the same conclusion.
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5. (1−p-value) is not the probability of the alternative hypothesis being true.
6. The significance level of the test is not determined by the p-value. The
significance level of a test is a value that should be decided upon by the
agent interpreting the data before the data are viewed, and is compared
against the p-value or any other statistic calculated after the test has been
performed. (However, reporting a p-value is more useful than simply saying
that the results were or were not significant at a given level, and allows the
reader to decide for himself whether to consider the results significant.)
7. The p-value does not indicate the size or importance of the observed effect
(compare with effect size). The two do vary together however – the larger
the effect, the smaller sample size will be required to get a significant p-
value.”
Are you still sure you had really understood what p-values mean?
4 Why there is such a problem?
Said in short, the reason of confusion is a mismatch between natural way of thinking and
what we have learned in statistics courses.7
4.1 “The essential problem of the experimental method”
Human minds reason very naturally in terms of how believable (or ‘likely’, or ‘probable’)
are different hypotheses in the light of everything we know about them (see e.g. [15])
and the mathematical theory of how beliefs are updated by new pieces of information
was basically developed in a monumental work of Laplace exactly two hundreds years
ago [16, 17], although nowadays this way of reasoning goes under the name Bayesian. This
approach considers valid sentences such as “probability that the CDF bump is a fluke”,
“probability that the Higgs boson mass is below 130 GeV,”8 and similar, all expressions
that refer to “a problem in the probability of causes, [. . . ] the essential problem of the
experimental method”[19]: from the observed effects we try to rank in probability the
alternative causes that might have produced them.
4.2 A curious ideology
Now the problem arises because of a curious ideology of statistic thinking (‘frequentism’)
that forbids to speak of probability of causes. It is not a matter of a different way of making
the calculations, but an ideological refuse to calculate them! Nevertheless – and this is the
7Having written quite a lot on the subject, I don’t want to go through yet another introduction to the
subject and refer to the ‘Columbo paper’ [5] (someone might find useful also [14]), only reminding here some
of the basic ideas.
8By the way it was about 36% percent by the best or our knowledge at the beginning of 1999 [18], and
it has changed with time, especially during 2011!
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worst! – most people, even if they think to adhere to the frequentistic approach (“probability
is the long run limit of relative frequency”, and so on), are not even aware that, according
to this unfortunately still dominant school, they should not be allowed to speak about
probability of true values, probability of causes, and so on. As a matter of fact, when I try
to tell it in seminars, people usually stare at me as I had just landed from a far planet.
4.3 The mismatch
As a consequence, the results of frequentistic methods are usually interpreted as if they
were probabilities of hypotheses, also because the names attached to them induce to think
so, because they do not correspond to what they really are. More or less like the misusing
of names, adjectives and expressions common in advertisements. It follows that some
results of frequentistic prescriptions are called confidence interval, confidence level or 95%
upper/lower C.L., although they are definitely not intended to mean how much we should
be confident on something.9 If you consider yourself a frequentist, but you find strange
what you are reading here, trust at least Neyman’s recommendations:
“Carry out your experiment, calculate the confidence interval, and state that c
belong to this interval. If you are asked whether you ‘believe’ that c belongs to
the confidence interval you must refuse to answer. In the long run your asser-
tions, if independent of each other, will be right in approximately a proportion
α of cases.” (J. Neyman, 1941, cited in Ref. [22])
Clearly, this is not what a scientist (as well as everybody else) wants. Otherwise, if one
is just happy to make statements that are e.g. 95% of times correct, there is no need
to waste time and money making experiments: just state 95% of times something that it
is practically certainly true and the remaining 5% something that is practically certainly
false.10
Put in other terms, if what you want is a quantitative assessment of how much you have
to be confident on something, on the basis of the information available to you, then use a
framework of reasoning that deals with probabilities. The fact that probabilities might be
be difficult to be precisely assessed in quantitative terms does not justify the fact that you
calculate something else and then use it as if it were a probability. For example, on the basis
of the evaluated probability you might want to take decisions, that is essentially making bets
of several kinds, that for example might be, sticking to particle physics activity: how much
9For example, when I ask about the meaning of 95% CL lower bound on Higgs mass from LEP direct
search, practically everybody – and I speak of particle physicists! – ‘explains’ the result in probabilistic
terms [20], although it is well known to frequentistic experts that “The lower bounds on the Higgs
mass that are quoted for the direct Higgs searches at LEP say absolutely nothing about the
probability of the Higgs mass being higher or lower than some value.”[21] (By the way, it seems
that the method described in [21] is essentially the one on which the LHC collaborations have agreed to
report search limits: at least you know now what these results (do not) mean!)
10If you want to try, you can play with The ultimate confidence intervals calculator [23] and no strict
follower of Neyman’s teaching can blame you of the results, that asymptotically will ‘cover’ the true value
of whatever quantity you have in mind in exactly the proportion of times you pre-define.
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emphasis you want to give to a ‘bump’ (just send a student to show it in a conference,
publish a paper, or even make press releases and organize a ‘cerimonius’ seminar with
prominent people sitting in the first rows); or if it is worth continuing an experiment; if
it is better to build another one; or perhaps to invest in new technologies; or even to
plan a future accelerator; and so on. In all cases, rational decisions require to balance the
utilities resulting from different scenarios, weighted by how probable you consider them.
Using p-values, or something similar, as if they were probabilities can lead to very bad
mistakes.11
11For example, in 2000 there was some excitement at CERN because some LEP experiments were observing
some events above the expectation and there was a big action against the CERN directorate, that had decided
to stop LEP in order to use structures and human/financial resources for LHC. This was an email I received
the 10th of November 2000, addressed to a short list of physicists:
Subject: Do you want the Higgs found next year?
As you may know CERN DG, L.Maiani, has decided to shut off LEP. The decision is to be
confirmed at a CERN Committee of Council meeting on Friday 17th.
As you probably know there is evidence for a Standard Model Higgs boson seen in the data
in the last few months, with a probability as a background fluctuation of 4 per mille, or 2.9
sigma.
. . .
In other words we are seeing exactly what we should expect if Mh=115.
. . .
[If you wonder why 2.9σ’s is 4 per mille, instead of 2, don’t ask me.]
The message ended with a request to write to Maiani in support of extending LEP run. Here follows my
instant reply:
Let me understand:
do you REALLY feel 99.6% sure that the Higgs is around 115GeV (let’s say below the effective
kinematical threshold at the present LEP energy)? If not, how much are you confident?
. . .
Running or not running is a delicate decision problem which involves beliefs and risks (both
financial and sociological). Therefore, I cannot disagree much with Maiani, being in his posi-
tion.
On the other hand, in the position of any LEP collaborator I would push to run, certainly!
(Given the same beliefs, the risk analysis is completely different).
Being myself neither the CERN Director-General, or a LEP physicist, but, with this respect,
just a physics educated tax payer, I find myself more on the side of Maiani than on that of
our LEP colleagues.
To make it clear, the “99.6%” could not be how much we had to rationally believe the Higgs was at 115GeV,
because it was a 0.004 p-value incorrectly turned into probability. Estimating correctly the probability, one
would have got a few percent (see e.g. [18] for the method, although the numbers had changed in the
meanwhile). And with a few percent, it would have been crazy to continue the LEP run, delay LHC and so
on. On the other hand, if there was really a 99.6% probability, then LEP had to go on. (As it often happens
with misinterpreted frequentistic methods, the errors are not little, like getting 99.6 for what should have
better been 99.1, 98.5, or even perhaps 97%! – see chapter 1 of [6] for other examples. Here one considered
practically certain something that was instead almost impossible.)
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5 The mathematics of beliefs
Among the web resources mentioned above, I find particularly enlighting Jon Butterworth’s
blob on the Guardian [13]. Let us go back to the expression he used to explain the statistical
meaning of the result, and compare it with the last paragraph of the article, split here into
three pieces (1-3):
(0) “the paper quotes a one-in-ten-thousand (0.0001) chance that this bump is a fluke.”
(1) “My money is on the false alarm at the moment,. . . ”
(2) “. . . but I would be very happy to lose it.”
(3) “And I reserve the right to change my mind rapidly as more data come in!”
We have already seen that proposition (0) is just a misleading misinterpretation of p-values,
about which there is little to discuss. Instead, the last paragraph is a masterpiece of correct
good reasoning (I would almost say Good’s reasoning [22]), that deserves some comments.
5.1 Stating the strength of “pragmatic beliefs” by odds
From proposition (1) we finally understand very well Butterworth’s beliefs, in spite of the
contradiction with (0). In fact, since ancient times betting has been recognized to be the
best way to check how much one really believes something, as well stated by Kant when he
talks about pragmatic beliefs: [24]
“The usual touchstone, whether that which someone asserts is merely his per-
suasion – or at least his subjective conviction, that is, his firm belief – is betting.
It often happens that someone propounds his views with such positive and un-
compromising assurance that he seems to have entirely set aside all thought
of possible error. A bet disconcerts him. Sometimes it turns out that he has
a conviction which can be estimated at a value of one ducat, but not of ten.
For he is very willing to venture one ducat, but when it is a question of ten he
becomes aware, as he had not previously been, that it may very well be that he
is in error.”
And, in fact, in the mathematical theory of probability of Laplace all probabilistic state-
ments can be mapped into betting statements, like his famous one concerning his evaluation
of the uncertainty on the value of the mass of Saturn: [17]
“To give some applications of this method I have just availed myself of the
opus magnus that Mr. Bouvard has just finished on the motions of Jupiter and
Saturn, of which he has given very precise tables. . . . His calculations give him
the mass of Saturn as 3,512th part of that of the sun. Applying my probabilistic
formulae to these observations, I find that the odds are 11,000 to 1 that the error
in this result is not a hundredth of its value.”
10
That is
P (3477 ≤MSun/MSat ≤ 3547 | I(Laplace)) = 99.99% ,
where I(Laplace) stands for all information available to Laplace (probabilistic statements
are always conditioned by a state of information). The Laplace’s result is a very clear
statement and there is a perfect match between beliefs, odds and probabilistic statement.
Instead, I ensure you, a “95% C.L. lower limit” result cannot be turned into a 19:1 bet that
the quantity in object is above that limit (see footnote 9), neither a p-value of e.g 10−4 can
be turned into a 10000:1 bet in favor of a discovery (see also the last minute reference [30].)
5.2 Coherent virtual bets
A few comments on the way Laplace reported his result in terms of betting odds are in
order.
• First, he does not say that he would be ready to make a 11,000 to 1 in favor of the
result, but rather that “the odds are 11,000 to 1”. This implies that “11,000 to 1
in favor” and “1 to 11,000 against” are both fair bets. This is essentially the idea
behind the so called de Finetti’s coherent bet [25]: in order to express your degree of
belief in favor of something, you fix the odds and leave somebody else to choose in
which direction to bet. This is the best way to force people to assess what they really
believe, no matter what the event is and how the probability has been evaluated (at
limit, just by intuitive reasonings, if no other means are available – why not? what
is important is that once you fix the odds you have no sensitive preference towards
either direction.).
• Second, what is the sense of a bet whose result would have not probably been solved
in Laplace’s lifetime? This is another important ingredient: the fact that bets have
to be considered hypothetical (‘virtual’). It is just a way to assess probability.12
5.3 Belief Vs imagination, beliefs Vs wish, subjective Vs arbitrary: the
role of the coherent (virtual) bet
The role of the bet, although virtual, in the sense of ‘as I would be called to bet’, is crucial
to make clear distinctions between different concepts that could otherwise be confused.
• We can imagine something, just combining ideas (even “the New Jerusalem, whose
pavement is gold and walls are rubies” – on this issue a reference to Hume is a
must [15], T.1.1.1.4), but, nevertheless, we could not believe it.
12But if you really have the chance of making real bets, don’t use the fair odds: you want to maximize the
expected gain! This is what insurance companies and professional bookmakers do: evaluate the fair odds
and then propose the most unfair ones in a given direction, unbalanced as much as someone can still accept
them.
11
• We should also be careful not to confuse what we wish with what we do belief. I
would like to win the highest prize playing at a lottery, but I don’t believe I will.
Similarly – and this is well stated in proposition (2) – I think everyone working in
frontier science would be very happy if something really new ‘appears’, such that it
forces us to change our vision of the world. But before we can accept something
like that we really need much experimental evidence, obtained in different ways with
different techniques.
• Finally, it is a matter of fact that
“Since the knowledge may be different with different persons or with the
same person at different times, they may anticipate the same event with
more or less confidence, and thus different numerical probabilities may be
attached to the same event.” [26]
It follows that probability is always conditional probability, as again well stated by
Schro¨dinger [26],
“Thus whenever we speak loosely of ‘the probability of an event,’ it is
always to be understood: probability with regard to a certain given state
of knowledge,”
i.e. P (E) has always be understood as P (E | I), where I stands for a given status
of information, that changes with persons (subjects) and time. Hence a probability
assessment has always to be meant as
P [E | Is(t)] .
This is the meaning of the adjective subjective attached to probability, that has nothing
to do with arbitrary. Once again, thinking in terms of bets, instead of noble but empty
ideals of ‘objectivity’ that can easily drift to ‘metaphysics’, helps to distinguish what
is really arbitrary from sound rational beliefs.
To conclude this subsection, when somebody claims something on the basis of arguments
that you do not clearly understand, follow Kant’s suggestion and ask him/her to bet for
money. And, if it is a claim in favor of new/extraordinary physics only based on a p-value,
don’t hesitate to cash, as nicely shown in the comic of figure 2 [27], appeared immedi-
ately after the recent (in?-)famous result on superluminar neutrinos [28]. (But, besides the
humorous side, I invite my colleagues to reflect on the fact the general public is not by
definition stupid and there is an increasing number of well educated tax payers who are
starting to get tired of fake claims.)
5.4 Updating beliefs
Let us come finally to proposition (3): rational people are ready to change their opinion in
front of ‘enough’ experimental evidence. What is enough? It is quite well understood that
it all depends on
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Figure 2: A comic from xkcd ,[27] on superluminar neutrino, valid for any fancy claim.
• how the new thing differs from from our initial beliefs;
• how strong our initial beliefs are.
This is the reason why practically nobody took very seriously the CDF claim (not even most
members of the collaboration, and I know several of them), while practically everybody is
now convinced that the Higgs boson has been finally caught at CERN [31] – no matter if
the so called ‘statistical significance’ is more ore less the same in both cases (which was,
by the way, more or less the same for the excitement at CERN described in footnote 11 –
nevertheless, the degree of belief of a Higgs boson found at CERN is substantially different!).
Probability theory teaches us how to update the degrees of belief on the different causes
that might be responsible of an ‘event’ (read ‘experimental data’), as simply explained by
Laplace in his Philosophical essay [17] (‘VI principle’13 at pag. 17 of the original book,
13In the Essai ‘principles’ do no stand for what we mean now as ‘first principles’, or ‘axioms’, but are
rather the fundamental rules of probability that Laplace had derived elsewhere.
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available at book.google.com – boldface is mine):
“The greater the probability of an observed event given any one of a number
of causes to which that event may be attributed, the greater the likelihood14
of that cause {given that event}. The probability of the existence of any one
of these causes {given the event} is thus a fraction whose numerator is the
probability of the event given the cause, and whose denominator is the sum
of similar probabilities, summed over all causes. If the various causes are not
equally probable a priory, it is necessary, instead of the probability of the event
given each cause, to use the product of this probability and the possibility of
the cause itself. This is the fundamental principle of that branch of the
analysis of chance that consists of reasoning a posteriori from events
to causes.”
This is the famous Bayes’ theorem (although Bayes did not really derive this formula, but
only developed a similar inferential reasoning for the parameter of Bernoulli trials15) that
we rewrite in mathematical terms [omitting the subjective ‘background condition’ Is(t) that
should appear – and be the same! – in all probabilities of the same equation] as
P (Ci |E) = P (E |Ci) · P (Ci)∑
j P (E |Cj) · P (Cj)
.
This formula teaches us that what matters is not (only) how much E is probable in the
light of Ci (unless it is impossible, in which case Ci it is ruled out – it is falsified to use a
Popperian expression), but rather
• how much P (E |Ci) compares with P (E |Cj), where Ci and Cj are two distinguished
causes that could be responsible of the same effect;
• how much P (Ci) compares to P (Cj).
14Note that here likelihood is the same as probability, and has nothing to do with what statisticians call
‘likelihood’ – reading directly the original French version might help, also taking into account that two
hundred years ago the nouns were not as specialized as they now are.
15In modern terms, the problem solved by Bayes in a quite convoluted notation [29] was the inference of
the binomial parameter p, conditioned on x successes in n trials, under the assumption that all values of p
were a priori equally likely
f(p |n, x) = f(x |n, p)∫
1
0
f(x |n, p) dp
.





is known as Laplace’s rule of succession.
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The essence of the Laplace(-Bayes) rule can be emphasized writing the above formula for
any couple of causes Ei and Ej as
P (Ci |E)
P (Cj |E) =
P (E |Ci)




the odds are updated by the observed effect E by a factor (‘Bayes factor’) given by the
ratio of the probabilities of the two causes to produce that effect.
In particular, we learn that:
• It makes no sense to speak about how the probability of Ci changes if:
– there is no alternative cause Cj;
– the way how Cj might produce E has not been modelled, i.e. if P (E |Cj) has
not been somehow assessed.
• The updating depends only on the Bayes factor, a function of the probability of E
given either hypotheses, and not on the probability of other events that have not been
observed and that are even less probable than E (upon which p-values are instead
calculated).
• One should be careful not to confuse P (Ci |E) with P (E |Ci), and in general, P (A |B)
with P (B |A). Or, moving to continuous variables, f(µ |x) with f(x |µ), where ‘f()’
stands, depending on the contest, for a probability function or for a probability density
function, while x and µ stand for an observed quantity and a true value, respectively.
In particular the latter points looks rather trivial, as it can be seen from the ’senator Vs
woman’ example of the abstract. But already the Gaussian generator example there might
confuse somebody, while the ‘µ Vs x’ example is a typical source of misunderstandings,
also because in the statistical jargon f(x |µ) is called ‘likelihood’ function of µ, and many
practitioners think it describes the probabilistic assessment concerning the possible values
of µ (again misuse of words! – for further comments see Appendix H of [5]).
6 Conclusions
Fake claims of discoveries are mainly caused by statistical prescriptions that do not follow
probabilistic reasoning, meant as mathematics of beliefs, as it was conceived as a whole by
Laplace and that nowadays is known under the appellative ‘Bayesian’. As a consequence
• the concept of probability of causes is refused;
• the role of Bayes’ theorem to update beliefs is rejected, and hence
– the role of prior knowledge is not explicitly recognized;
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– the myth has been created that a single hypothesis can be ‘tested’ without taking
explicitly into account alternative(s);
• the intuitive concept of ‘probabilities of causes’ has been surrogated by ad hoc hy-
pothesis test prescriptions,
– whose choice and use are rather arbitrary;
– whose results are routinely misinterpreted.
Unfortunately, this wobbly construction faces against the human predisposition to think
naturally in terms of degrees of belief about anything we are in condition of uncertainty,
including the several causes that might have produced the observed effects. The result of
this mismatch is that
• probabilities of the effects given the causes are confused with the probabilities of the
causes given the effects;
• even worse, p-values are used as if they were the probability that the hypothesis under
test is true .
In addition, the pretension that ‘priors are not scientific and should not enter the game’
(“the data should speak by themselves”) avoids that sound scientific priors mitigate the
deleterious effects of misunderstood p-values.
But, fortunately, being the natural intuition of physicists rather ‘Bayesian’ [20], after all
it is more a question of rough scientific communication than of rough science. In fact, even
the initial excitement of someone who takes a bit too seriously claims that the rest of the
physics community classifies immediately as ‘fake’ – priors! – is harmless, if the discussions
remain in the community. And the debates are often even profitable, because they offer
an opportunity to check how new possible phenomena and new explanations could fit into
the present network of beliefs based on all previous experimental observations. This is for
example what has recently happened with the exchange of ideas that has followed the Opera
result on neutrino speed, from which most of us have learned something.
As far as the communication of claims to non experts, that include also physicists of
other branches, or even of a close sub-branch, my recommendation is of making use, at
least qualitatively, of the Bayesian odd update, i.e.
• state how much the experimental data push towards either possibility (that is the
Bayes factor, which has nothing to do with p-values);
• state also how believable are the two hypotheses independently of the data in object.
I am pretty sure most people can make a good use of these pieces of information. Moreover,
my recommendation to journalist and opinion makers (including bloggers and similar) is
that, in the case of doubt:
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• don’t accept answers in terms of p-values, unless you are sure you understand them
well and you feel capable to explain their correct meaning to the general public without
they become somehow probabilities of the hypotheses to be compared (good luck!);
• refuse as well ‘confidence levels’, ‘95% confidence exclusion curves’ and similar;
• ask straight the direct questions:
– How probable it is? (Possibly informing – threatening! – him/her in advance
that his/her answer will be reported as “Dr X.Y. considers it such and such
percent probable”.)
– How much do you believe? (Same as the previous one.)
– How much would you believe in either hypothesis if you did not have this data?
(The answer allows you to estimate the priors odds.)
– How much would you believe in either hypothesis given these data, if you con-
sidered the two hypotheses initially equally probable? (The answer allows you
to evaluate the Bayes factor.)
– How much would you bet in favor of your claim? (And if you realize there are
the conditions described in section 5.3 and figure 2, don’t miss the opportunity
to gain some money!)
To end, I would like to congratulate all people working at LHC on the amazing high quality
work done in these years and on having been able to report these convincing hints on the
Higgs boson in a record time (I had never betted in favor of this possibility in 2011 even
six months ago! But now the real exciting bet is what next?).
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Appendix: ‘???’ at Fermilab Vs Higgs boson at CERN
Since, just before I was going to post this paper there has been the joint ATLAS and CMS
seminar on the Higgs boson search at CERN, followed by days of rumors, I cannot avoid to
add here some last minute comments on these results, comparing them with the CDF case.
The big difference between the Fermilab result discussed here and that of CERN [31] is
essentially a question of priors, whose role was discussed in section 5. If we observe some-
thing unexpected, we need an overwhelming experimental evidence before we are convinced
this is really a genuine discovery, which is not case of the highly expected Higgs at LHC.
These are the arguments in favor of the fact that the elusive beast has been finally surrounded
(every particle hunter sniffs it, although it will be considered to finally in ‘our hands’ only
when we shall be able, with the increasing number of events, to study its behavior, such as
decay modes etc.):
• the so called Standard Model of particle physics provides an excellent description of
a network of experimental facts, and such a particle is required to give a sense to the
theory;
• the indirect information on the Higgs boson (‘radiative corrections’) constrains its
mass at the order of magnitude of 100GeV (although with a large uncertainty – see
[18] for a probability distribution, even though this has been slightly changing with
time);
• direct searches at LEP have pushed its mass with almost certainty above 114GeV;16
• similarly, direct searches at the LHC and at the Tevatron have squeezed its mass
value into a relative narrow window (I save the reader yet another disquisition on the
meaning of those limits);
• the CERN indication shows up
– in the middle of the remaining window of possibility (and then not in contradic-
tion with other experimental pieces of information);
– with production rate in agreement with the theory and with many other experi-
ments (from which the theoretical parameters have been inferred);
– with decay modes also in substantial agreement with expectations;
– in two detectors, although with some differences that can be considered physio-
logical, taking into account of the difficulty of the search.
16As mentioned in footnote 9, the 95% CL bound has nothing to do with 95% probability that its value
was above the bounds. Translating the experimental information from the direct search into probabilistic
assessments is not that easy, because the number also depends on the upper limits. In particular, if there
would be ‘no’ upper bound on the mass (that obviously cannot weigh grams!) there is no way to calculate
the required probability. For further details see [18] and chapter 13 of [6].
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In addition, I would also like to remark that the presentations of the two team leaders have
been rather prudential, as if, instead of the Higgs, it were just an unexpected bunch of
extra events in the middle of nowhere.
Some further remarks are in order.
• The reason why practically every particle physicist is highly confident that the Higgs
is in the region indicated by LHC has little to do with the number of sigma’s (I hope
the reader understands now that the mythical value of 5 for a ‘true discovery’ is by
itself pure nonsense, as it is clear from the comparison between ‘???’ at the Tevatron
and the Higgs boson at CERN in the only place it could be after it has been hunted
unfruitfully elsewhere.17)
• This number of sigma’s cannot be turned in probabilistic statements (or odds!) about
Higgs or not-Higgs, as we read again on The New York Times:18
The Atlas result has a chance of less than one part in 5,000 of
being due to a lucky background noise, which is impressive but far
short of the standard for a “discovery,” which requires one in 3.5 million
odds of being a random fluctuation. [30]
(Again misinterpreted p-values – basta!)
• Instead, if we want to make quantitative probabilistic assessments, we need the like-
lihoods (this time this noun has the technical meaning statisticians use), per each ex-
periment and per each channel, instead of the frequentistic 95% CL exclusion curves,
of dubious meaning and useless to be combined. A plea to the LHC collaborations is
therefore in order: please publish likelihoods.
• In the past days I have visited some internet resources to check the rumors. As a
result
– I have seen quite a lot ‘creative thinking’ concerning related statistics/probability
matter (starting from the New York Time article cited above) and you can
amuse yourself browsing the web. I just would like to suggest to Italian read-
ers http://www.keplero.org/2011/12/higgs.html where there are some at-
tempts (in particular by nicola farina and Moping Owl) to clarify some prob-
abilistic issues;
– in the name of many contributors to forums and blogs, I make special plea to
my colleagues physicists and to journalists:
please stop relating the Higgs boson to God!
17And if it wouldn’t exist at all? OK, formulate the alternative model and try to assess your beliefs in
the alternatives.
18I definitely hope that when this influential newspaper reports on probability of important, uncertain
scenarios that really matter for our lives, such as economy, health, international crises, future of the Planet
and so on, its experts really know what they are talking about!
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